Appendix A: Supplemental Materials

These supplementary materials describe and present a series of robustness tests to assess the durability of the findings presented in the main document. In all, the paper's main findings are impressively robust to alternative specifications of the key variables and modeling assumptions. All models present regression coefficients in bold and robust p-values (rather than standard errors) in plain text beneath the coefficients.

Section A1: Baseline Conflict Propensities

First, I present a baseline model of conflict propensities to determine if rivalry, distance, and political compatibility are valid indicators of a state's "traditional adversaries." This is necessary to determine if an empirical examination of the three Rally Hypotheses offers a valid test of the rally around the flag theory. The results of the baseline model are presented in Table A1.

The results indicate that the Hypotheses R1, R2, and R3 are indeed faithfully derived from the rally around the flag theory. Distance and Rivalry are both significant with well over 99.9% confidence for all three samples. *S* Score is significant at a comparable level for the full sample and autocratic models. Although the significance is slightly lower for democratic initiators (p=.045), the model still indicates that geopolitical compatibility is a strong predictor of states' baseline conflict propensities. Table A1 also indicates, importantly, that states typically shy away from initiating disputes against powerful targets. The coefficient for target power is negative and significant in all three models. Powerful states do not constitute traditional adversaries.

Usefully, Table A1 also reveals that domestic unrest has a positive effect on conflict initiation in two of the three models. The full sample and democratic models show a significant conflict-inducing effect of unrest. The autocratic sample shows a positive but statistically insignificant effect. For democratic states especially, there is strong support for the basic diversionary conflict premise that unrest at home promotes conflict abroad.

Table A1: Baseline Model*

	Full	Dem	Auth
TARGET POWER	**-0.494**	**-0.439**	**-0.635**
	0.000	0.007	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.023**	**-0.134**	**-0.016**
	0.000	0.000	0.265
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.013**	**-0.014**	**0.028**
	0.006	0.084	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.326**	**-0.259**	**-0.401**
	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.728**	**-0.199**	**0.949**
	0.088	0.879	0.023
S SCORE	**-1.203**	**-0.614**	**-1.505**
	0.000	0.045	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.128**	**1.039**	**-0.491**
	0.457	0.001	0.021
RIVALRY	**1.852**	**2.291**	**1.548**
	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.221**	**-0.289**	**-0.183**
	0.004	0.014	0.079
UNREST	**0.015**	**0.011**	**0.015**
	0.000	0.006	0.226
CONSTANT	**-1.669**	**-1.895**	**-0.938**
	0.000	0.000	0.007
n	**74808**	**39114**	**35694**

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Section A2: Non-Linear Conditional Effect

As discussed in the text (p 11), Tarar's formal model of diversionary conflict actually predicts a non-linear conditional effect, with unrest pushing leaders into conflict primarily with moderately powerful targets. Weak targets promise an easy victory, but such a conflict will not effectively demonstrate a leader's competence because the population attributes the victory primarily to the power imbalance. But extremely powerful targets are also unattractive, as the conflict will likely end in a defeat. The conflict-inducing effect of unrest should thus diminish against extremely powerful targets. Tarar does not specify the exact shape of this non-linear relationship, although it appears that it should resemble a full inverse-U shaped curve.

I test this proposition using a quadratic interaction term, (Unrest X Target Power)^2. The results offer moderate support for the non-linearity hypothesis. The quadratic term is negative and highly significant in both the full sample and democratic models. It is negative in the authoritarian model, but highly insignificant. In all models, however, the size of the coefficient is quite low. As confirmed in the graphs below, this indicates that the non-linearity does not constitute a full inverse-U shaped relationship. Rather, the marginal effect remains positive but diminishes in magnitude at high levels of Target Power. According to these results, extremely powerful targets are still more attractive than moderately powerful ones. The difference between them is simply smaller than the difference between weak and moderately powerful targets. In short, moderately powerful targets are far more attractive than weak targets, while extremely powerful targets are only somewhat more attractive than moderately powerful ones.

This monotonically positive conditional effect does not necessarily undermine Tarar's model. As shown in the paper, Tarar assumes that conflict escalates to full-scale war, in which case a severe power imbalance is highly likely to result in defeat for the weaker power. But if we relax this assumption and allow the diverting leader to de-escalate the dispute short of war in return for some form of diplomatic concession, then targeting extremely powerful states might be optimal. Even a minimal concession, when extracted from a great power, might represent a strong signal of the leader's competence. In effect, embattled leaders might initiate a dispute against a great power target, hoping to extract any form of concession, de-escalate the dispute, and spin it as a diplomatic victory back home. In this way, leaders can avoid the certain defeat that would result from open military conflict, while still demonstrating competence. Table A2 below presents the results.

Table A2: Quadratic Model

	Full	Dem	Auth
TARGET POWER	**-0.711**	**-0.797**	**-0.811**
	0.000	0.000	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.026**	**-0.135**	**-0.021**
	0.000	0.000	0.146
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.014**	**-0.011**	**0.028**
	0.004	0.189	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.323**	**-0.255**	**-0.392**
	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.736**	**-0.123**	**0.954**
	0.088	0.926	0.023
S SCORE	**-1.255**	**-0.633**	**-1.499**
	0.000	0.040	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.017**	**1.151**	**-0.472**
	0.920	0.000	0.026
RIVALRY	**1.843**	**2.257**	**1.574**
	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.225**	**-0.310**	**-0.214**
	0.003	0.008	0.041
MASS UNREST	**0.002**	**0.000**	**-0.036**
	0.759	0.979	0.088
UNREST X TARG POWER	**0.157**	**0.176**	**0.154**
	0.000	0.000	0.012
(UNREST X TARG POWER)^2	**-0.003**	**-0.004**	**-0.001**
	0.006	0.004	0.814
CONSTANT	**-1.632**	**-1.859**	**-0.917**
	0.000	0.000	0.009
n	74,808	39,114	35,694

Figure A2: Non-linear Conditional Effect

Figure A2 depicts the non-linear conditional effect graphically. The dashed line illustrates the effect of target power on dispute initiation under diversionary conditions. The line reveals a slightly non-linear effect, flattening out on the right hand side of the graph, while remaining monotonically positive. Indeed, under diversionary conditions of high unrest, an increase in target power from 0 to .1 raises the probability of dispute initiation .071%. An increase in target power from .9 to 1, however, raises the probability of dispute initiation only .033%. The marginal increase is less than half as large.

In short, the results support Tarar's claim that the conditional effect of unrest is non-linear, but do not show a full inverse-U shaped relationship. Stronger targets are always more likely to attract diversionary disputes. But at low levels of target power, the marginal effect is significantly greater than at high levels. Moderately powerful targets are much more attractive than weak ones. Extremely powerful targets are still more attractive than moderately powerful ones, but only marginally so.



Section A3: Transformations of Mass Unrest

I now move on to assessing the robustness of the findings presented in the main manuscript. First, I ran several tests to see if the results were influenced by the positively skewed distribution of the unrest variable. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 indicate that the mass unrest variable is indeed right skewed, and these tests will examine if the findings are sensitive to this distribution. Below, I rerun the original models using both the natural log (Table A3-1) and common log (Table A3-2) of the unrest variable. I also run the models after dropping outlying observations of unrest to see if these cases were influential in the main results (Table A3-3).

The results presented below reaffirm our confidence in Hypothesis G1. Tables A3-1, A3-2, and A3-3 all show that the interaction of Unrest and Target Power is positive and highly significant for each sample of observations. The results also reaffirm our rejection of the Rally Hypotheses, closely mirroring the findings presented in the paper. None of the models show a significant interaction effect in the direction that rally around the flag would predict. And again, several models show a strong interactive effect in the opposite direction. In all three tables, unrest is more likely to spark conflict against distant and compatible states in the full sample and democratic models. Unrest is significantly less likely to produce conflict against rivals in all three autocratic models.

Table A3-1: Natural Log of Mass Unrest*

	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Auth**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Auth**
TARGET POWER	**-0.775**	**-0.990**	**-0.841**	**-0.430**	**-0.351**	**-0.606**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.027**	**-0.132**	**-0.024**	**-0.026**	**-0.131**	**-0.020**
	0.000	0.000	0.096	0.000	0.000	0.165
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.013**	**-0.012**	**0.028**	**0.011**	**-0.014**	**0.028**
	0.006	0.146	0.000	0.019	0.092	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.321**	**-0.254**	**-0.393**	**-0.384**	**-0.370**	**-0.413**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.695**	**-0.183**	**0.903**	**0.709**	**-0.315**	**0.944**
	0.107	0.889	0.032	0.095	0.807	0.024
S SCORE	**-1.262**	**-0.604**	**-1.485**	**-1.677**	**-1.517**	**-1.586**
	0.000	0.048	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**0.028**	**1.280**	**-0.437**	**-0.059**	**1.102**	**-0.451**
	0.873	0.000	0.042	0.737	0.000	0.035
RIVALRY	**1.845**	**2.255**	**1.567**	**1.786**	**2.082**	**1.672**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.226**	**-0.284**	**-0.207**	**-0.214**	**-0.305**	**-0.190**
	0.003	0.015	0.046	0.005	0.010	0.065
LN(UNREST)	**0.016**	**-0.048**	**-0.108**	**-0.389**	**-0.664**	**0.159**
	0.766	0.497	0.256	0.015	0.007	0.587
UNREST X TARGET POWER	**0.527**	**0.683**	**0.564**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	---	---	---
UNREST X RIVALRY	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.102**	**0.166**	**-0.293**
	---	---	---	0.182	0.115	0.024
UNREST X DISTANCE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.060**	**0.098**	**0.018**
	---	---	---	0.001	0.002	0.548
UNREST X *S* SCORE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.573**	**0.780**	**0.090**
	---	---	---	0.001	0.004	0.788
CONSTANT	**-1.644**	**-1.891**	**-0.969**	**-1.350**	**-1.146**	**-1.005**
	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.019	0.009
n	**74808**	**39114**	**35694**	**74808**	**39114**	**35694**

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Table A3-2: Common Log of Mass Unrest

	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Auth**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Auth**
Target Power	**-0.775**	**-0.990**	**-0.841**	**-0.430**	**-0.351**	**-0.606**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.000
Sender Democracy	**-0.027**	**-0.132**	**-0.024**	**-0.026**	**-0.131**	**-0.020**
	0.000	0.000	0.096	0.000	0.000	0.165
Target Democracy	**0.013**	**-0.012**	**0.028**	**0.011**	**-0.014**	**0.028**
	0.006	0.146	0.000	0.019	0.092	0.000
Distance	**-0.321**	**-0.254**	**-0.393**	**-0.384**	**-0.370**	**-0.413**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Trade	**0.695**	**-0.183**	**0.903**	**0.709**	**-0.315**	**0.944**
	0.107	0.889	0.032	0.095	0.807	0.024
S-Score	**-1.262**	**-0.604**	**-1.485**	**-1.677**	**-1.517**	**-1.586**
	0.000	0.048	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Fractionalization	**0.028**	**1.280**	**-0.437**	**-0.059**	**1.102**	**-0.451**
	0.873	0.000	0.042	0.737	0.000	0.035
Rivalry	**1.845**	**2.255**	**1.567**	**1.786**	**2.082**	**1.672**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Other Dispute	**-0.226**	**-0.284**	**-0.207**	**-0.214**	**-0.305**	**-0.190**
	0.003	0.015	0.046	0.005	0.010	0.065
Log Unrest (base 10)	**0.038**	**-0.110**	**-0.250**	**-0.896**	**-1.528**	**0.366**
	0.766	0.497	0.256	0.015	0.007	0.587
Unrest X Target Power	**1.215**	**1.573**	**1.299**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	---	---	---
Unrest X Rivalry	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.235**	**0.381**	**-0.674**
	---	---	---	0.182	0.115	0.024
Unrest X Distance	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.151**	**0.225**	**0.041**
	---	---	---	0.001	0.002	0.548
Unrest X S-Score	**---**	**---**	**---**	**1.319**	**1.797**	**0.208**
	---	---	---	0.001	0.004	0.788
Constant	**-1.644**	**-1.891**	**-0.969**	**-1.350**	**-1.146**	**-1.005**
	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.019	0.009
n	**74808**	**39114**	**35694**	**74808**	**39114**	**35694**

Table A3-3: Dropping Unrest Outliers

	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Auth**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Auth**
Target Power	**-0.753**	**-0.908**	**-0.803**	**-0.530**	**-0.429**	**-0.673**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000
Sender Democracy	**-0.026**	**-0.128**	**-0.021**	**-0.025**	**-0.120**	**-0.019**
	0.000	0.000	0.142	0.000	0.000	0.179
Target Democracy	**0.015**	**-0.010**	**0.028**	**0.012**	**-0.012**	**0.027**
	0.002	0.251	0.000	0.014	0.177	0.000
Distance	**-0.333**	**-0.275**	**-0.393**	**-0.358**	**-0.329**	**-0.393**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Trade	**0.725**	**-0.152**	**0.966**	**0.753**	**-0.183**	**1.014**
	0.094	0.908	0.022	0.077	0.885	0.015
S-Score	**-1.297**	**-0.649**	**-1.490**	**-1.697**	**-1.435**	**-1.603**
	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Fractionalization	**-0.138**	**1.043**	**-0.501**	**-0.182**	**0.881**	**-0.502**
	0.435	0.001	0.019	0.301	0.006	0.018
Rivalry	**1.828**	**2.219**	**1.565**	**1.818**	**2.118**	**1.644**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Other Dispute	**-0.230**	**-0.252**	**-0.228**	**-0.214**	**-0.260**	**-0.215**
	0.003	0.032	0.030	0.006	0.028	0.039
Mass Unrest	**-0.020**	**-0.036**	**-0.041**	**-0.169**	**-0.221**	**-0.036**
	0.205	0.069	0.123	0.004	0.006	0.692
Unrest X Target Power	**0.140**	**0.182**	**0.136**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	---	---	---
Unrest X Rivalry	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.014**	**0.037**	**-0.086**
	---	---	---	0.563	0.243	0.021
Unrest X Distance	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.012**	**0.020**	**-0.004**
	---	---	---	0.088	0.026	0.683
Unrest X S-Score	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.226**	**0.262**	**0.104**
	---	---	---	0.000	0.002	0.320
Constant	**-1.482**	**-1.729**	**-0.883**	**-1.225**	**-1.221**	**-0.883**
	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.009	0.016
n	**73225**	**37719**	**35506**	**73225**	**37719**	**35506**

Figure A3: Conditional Effect Plots with Logarithmic Transformation

The logarithmic transformations of the unrest variable produce a tighter and less-skewed distribution of the unrest variable. Figures 2 and 3 in the main manuscript simply show the effect of unrest across a limited range (two standard deviations) of unrest values, visually excluding outlying observations. But the logarithmic transformation corrects for any effects arising from this skewness and also allows a wider range of unrest values to be incorporated into these figures. The graphs below reproduce the original conditional effect plots from the main manuscript, but using the common log transformation and incorporating the entire range of unrest values.





Section A4: GDP Growth

Many studies of diversionary war utilize a measure of national economic performance as a proxy for domestic turmoil or leadership instability. According to this logic, economic performance is the vital determinant of a leader's popularity and domestic perceptions of the leader's competence and quality. As such, lacking reliable cross-national public opinion surveys, data on economic growth can be a useful proxy for leader popularity. Tarar's theoretical model and some important empirical work on the topic question this logic, as leaders are not uniformly perceived to be in control of economic performance (Tarar 2006, Brule and Williams 2009, Johnson and Barnes 2011). Some leaders, for example, inherited a poorly performing economy, and continued economic malaise is not necessarily an immediate threat to their tenure. Below, I test whether economic growth has an effect on conflict initiation, and whether this effect is mediated by the various target characteristics. Data on annual GDP growth are taken from Banks' (2012) CNTS data set.

The results show that GDP growth has very little effect on conflict initiation, either conditionally or unconditionally. The democratic sample in column two shows a slightly significant diversionary effect, with GDP growth reducing the probability of conflict initiation ($p=.072$). This implies that lower levels of growth have a positive effect on conflict. But importantly, this effect is not significantly conditioned by target type. In short, using GDP growth as an indicator of leadership instability undermines diversionary war theory more generally, and thus necessarily undermines both the rally and gambling theories. The results are presented in Table A4.

Table A4: GDP Growth*

	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Auth**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Auth**
TARGET POWER	**-0.531**	**-0.527**	**-0.668**	**-0.514**	**-0.485**	**-0.653**
	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.019**	**-0.081**	**-0.010**	**-0.019**	**-0.081**	**-0.010**
	0.000	**0.010**	**0.471**	**0.000**	**0.009**	**0.462**
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.010**	**-0.026**	**0.029**	**0.010**	**-0.025**	**0.029**
	0.040	0.004	0.000	0.039	0.004	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.314**	**-0.253**	**-0.393**	**-0.307**	**-0.238**	**-0.396**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.812**	**0.028**	**1.004**	**0.810**	**-0.006**	**1.005**
	0.053	0.983	0.015	0.054	0.996	0.015
S SCORE	**-1.242**	**-0.392**	**-1.561**	**-1.150**	**-0.215**	**-1.545**
	0.000	0.200	0.000	0.000	0.536	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.029**	**1.210**	**-0.451**	**-0.025**	**1.219**	**-0.448**
	0.869	0.000	0.033	0.885	0.000	0.034
RIVALRY	**1.819**	**2.199**	**1.568**	**1.805**	**2.235**	**1.535**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.258**	**-0.349**	**-0.197**	**-0.258**	**-0.346**	**-0.197**
	0.001	0.005	0.061	0.001	0.005	0.060
GROWTH	**-.000**	**-.0002**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
	0.455	0.072	0.915	0.470	0.312	0.942
GROWTH X TARG PWR	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.620	0.458	0.702	---	---	---
GROWTH X RIVALRY	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.000**	**-0.00**	**0.000**
	---	---	---	0.711	0.471	0.425
GROWTH X DISTANCE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**-0.00**	**-0.00**	**0.000**
	---	---	---	0.523	0.211	0.737
GROWTH X *S* SCORE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**-0.00**	**-0.00**	**-0.00**
	---	---	---	0.387	0.162	0.924
CONSTANT	**-1.537**	**-2.265**	**-0.835**	**-1.627**	**-2.472**	**-0.847**
	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.000	0.020
n	72938	37900	35038	72938	37900	35038

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Section A5: Elite Unrest

Some important work on diversionary conflict argues that domestic political unrest should have differing effects depending on the nature of the unrest itself. More specifically, it matters greatly whether the agitators are common citizens or political elites. Pickering and Kisangani (2005, 2010) have highlighted the differential effects of mass and elite unrest, showing that democratic and authoritarian regimes respond differently to various types of turmoil. I address this issue by running my models using Pickering and Kisangani's measure of elite unrest. This measure sums the number of government crises, purges and coup attempts in any given year, and is intended to capture discontent among political elites rather who have more influence over government policy and composition. These data are again taken from Banks (2012).

The results remain strongly supportive of Hypothesis G1, as the effect of elite unrest on conflict initiation is positively and significantly conditioned by target power. Importantly, this general finding holds across all three gambling models. This indicates that government response to elite unrest does not differ appreciably across regime types. The elite unrest models again offer no support for the Rally Hypotheses. Only three of the nine interactive coefficients in the rally models point in the predicted direction, and none approach statistical significance. In three models, the conditioning effect of political compatibility is significant in the wrong direction. In these models in particular, diversionary conflict seems to be more likely to target compatible states. Generally, the results in Table A5 support the gambling for resurrection theory and further undermine the rally around the flag theory.

Table A5: Elite Unrest*

	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Aut**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Aut**
TARGET POWER	**-0.652**	**-0.682**	**-0.707**	**-0.533**	**-0.446**	**-0.640**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.020**	**-0.136**	**-0.017**	**-0.020**	**-0.135**	**-0.016**
	0.000	0.000	0.228	0.000	0.000	0.266
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.013**	**-0.015**	**0.028**	**0.013**	**-0.015**	**0.028**
	0.008	0.078	0.000	0.008	0.069	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.316**	**-0.253**	**-0.396**	**-0.316**	**-0.274**	**-0.393**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.722**	**-0.223**	**0.935**	**0.733**	**-0.301**	**0.948**
	0.091	0.866	0.025	0.087	0.822	0.023
S SCORE	**-1.196**	**-0.574**	**-1.441**	**-1.321**	**-0.978**	**-1.458**
	0.000	0.061	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.075**	**1.116**	**-0.486**	**-0.085**	**1.079**	**-0.491**
	0.668	0.000	0.021	0.627	0.001	0.020
RIVALRY	**1.858**	**2.279**	**1.555**	**1.910**	**2.387**	**1.579**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.208**	**-0.247**	**-0.202**	**-0.207**	**-0.273**	**-0.195**
	0.006	0.033	0.050	0.007	0.020	0.058
ELITE UNREST	**-0.047**	**-0.141**	**0.000**	**-0.077**	**-0.465**	**0.067**
	0.233	0.073	1.000	0.407	0.071	0.506
UNREST X TARG POWER	**0.192**	**0.362**	**0.114**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.000	0.003	0.019	---	---	---
UNREST X RIVALRY	**---**	**---**	**---**	**-0.094**	**-0.208**	**-0.040**
	---	---	---	0.080	0.114	0.522
UNREST X DISTANCE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**-0.005**	**0.025**	**-0.010**
	---	---	---	0.729	0.463	0.697
UNREST X *S* SCORE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.167**	**0.669**	**-0.013**
	---	---	---	0.092	0.020	0.910
CONSTANT	**-1.618**	**-1.802**	**-0.982**	**-1.578**	**-1.595**	**-0.996**
	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.006
n	74824	39114	35710	71332	39114	35710

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Section A6: Contemporaneous Unrest

The models presented in the paper use a lagged measure of mass unrest to ensure that the domestic political turmoil is causally prior to the conflict initiation, not the result of it. But this empirical strategy presents some potential problems, as an embattled leader may be unable to wait a year to initiate a diversionary conflict. If a leader's tenure is threatened in year t_1, a diversionary conflict in year t_2 may come too late to save their government. To account for this possibility, I reran the models using both an unlagged measure of domestic mass unrest, as well as the two-year running average of mass unrest (i.e. (lagged unrest + current unrest)/2). This will help assess whether the results presented in the body of the paper are an artifact of an inappropriately lagged independent variable.

The results presented in Tables A6a and A6b are virtually identical to those presented in the main paper. The effect of unrest is positively conditioned by target power in all six gambling models, strongly supporting Hypothesis G1. The Rally Hypotheses again find no support, with five of the nine interactive coefficients significant in the wrong direction. In short, the results presented in the paper do not appear to be an artifact of the lagged independent variable.

Table A6a: Current Unrest*

	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Aut**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Aut**
TARGET POWER	**-0.656**	**-0.685**	**-0.738**	**-0.501**	**-0.493**	**-0.614**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.022**	**-0.127**	**-0.020**	**-0.021**	**-0.130**	**-0.018**
	0.000	0.000	0.148	0.000	0.000	0.200
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.014**	**-0.013**	**0.029**	**0.013**	**-0.015**	**0.029**
	0.002	0.116	0.000	0.006	0.069	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.331**	**-0.268**	**-0.400**	**-0.344**	**-0.300**	**-0.391**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.630**	**-0.402**	**0.852**	**0.609**	**-0.478**	**0.862**
	0.143	0.764	0.041	0.152	0.719	0.038
S SCORE	**-1.243**	**-0.584**	**-1.482**	**-1.357**	**-0.774**	**-1.453**
	0.000	0.052	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.086**	**1.125**	**-0.501**	**-0.144**	**1.081**	**-0.512**
	0.615	0.000	0.016	0.397	0.000	0.014
RIVALRY	**1.911**	**2.304**	**1.647**	**1.893**	**2.273**	**1.685**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.208**	**-0.222**	**-0.210**	**-0.203**	**-0.202**	**-0.208**
	0.006	0.052	0.040	0.007	0.078	0.042
MASS UNREST	**-0.006**	**-0.010**	**-0.024**	**-0.032**	**-0.050**	**0.069**
	0.386	0.207	0.183	0.037	0.031	0.448
UNREST X TARG POWER	**0.089**	**0.081**	**0.114**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	---	---	---
UNREST X RIVALRY	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.010**	**0.012**	**-0.043**
	---	---	---	0.221	0.217	0.051
UNREST X DISTANCE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**.004**	**0.007**	**-0.010**
	---	---	---	0.100	0.022	0.163
UNREST X *S* SCORE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.044**	**0.040**	**-0.025**
	---	---	---	0.017	0.152	0.800
CONSTANT	**-1.640**	**-1.923**	**-1.009**	**-1.558**	**-1.725**	**-1.097**
	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.003
n	76625	40096	36529	76625	40096	36529

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Table A6b: Average of Lagged and Contemporaneous Unrest*

	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Aut**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Aut**
TARGET POWER	**-0.709**	**-0.735**	**-0.843**	**-0.494**	**-0.456**	**-0.639**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.007	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.025**	**-0.131**	**-0.023**	**-0.023**	**-0.134**	**-0.020**
	0.000	0.000	0.111	0.000	0.000	0.171
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.014**	**-0.013**	**0.028**	**0.012**	**-0.015**	**0.028**
	0.003	0.142	0.000	0.010	0.074	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.323**	**-0.256**	**-0.391**	**-0.345**	**-0.296**	**-0.390**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.755**	**-0.121**	**0.956**	**0.717**	**-0.281**	**0.964**
	0.079	0.927	0.023	0.092	0.830	0.022
S SCORE	**-1.241**	**-0.581**	**-1.506**	**-1.414**	**-0.878**	**-1.452**
	0.000	0.059	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.037**	**1.162**	**-0.455**	**-0.118**	**1.108**	**-0.462**
	0.830	0.000	0.033	0.494	0.000	0.030
RIVALRY	**1.843**	**2.265**	**1.579**	**1.822**	**2.226**	**1.651**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.232**	**-0.285**	**-0.215**	**-0.215**	**-0.261**	**-0.198**
	0.003	0.015	0.038	0.005	0.027	0.055
TWO YEAR UNREST	**-0.002**	**-0.005**	**-0.044**	**-0.042**	**-0.056**	**0.144**
	0.770	0.508	0.083	0.015	0.016	0.093
UNREST X TARG POWER	**0.116**	**0.101**	**0.179**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	---	---	---
UNREST X RIVALRY	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.010**	**0.012**	**-0.085**
	---	---	---	0.232	0.222	0.004
UNREST X DISTANCE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.006**	**0.008**	**-0.008**
	---	---	---	0.016	0.006	0.266
UNREST X *S* SCORE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.063**	**0.056**	**-0.086**
	---	---	---	0.004	0.045	0.366
CONSTANT	**-1.609**	**-1.894**	**-0.921**	**-1.480**	**-1.620**	**-1.077**
	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.004
n	74773	39114	35659	74773	39114	35659

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Section A7: Fatal Disputes

As mentioned briefly in the text, the most interesting results arise from the models run using *fatal* disputes as the dependent variable. In these tests, I coded the dependent variable as one for an observation only if a MID was initiated that resulted in at least one fatality. Disputes that involve actual violence may systematically differ from lower level "diversionary spectacles" (Oakes 2012).

I find this to be the case. The models below offer less support for the Gambling Hypothesis, as only the full sample model shows the effect of unrest to be positively conditioned by target power. The democratic and autocratic samples show that target power has no effect on diversionary conflict incentives. Table A7 thus offers only limited support for Hypothesis G1.

But interestingly, Table A7 offers significant support for Hypothesis R1, which claims that diversionary conflict should be more likely to target rival states. Both the full sample and democratic models show domestic unrest to disproportionately produce conflict against rival targets. The results for proximate and incompatible targets continue to strongly reject the rally around the flag theory. In conjunction with the results presented in Table 1 of the main manuscript, it appears that embattled leaders do not tend to seek out rival states when initiating diversionary conflict. But in those instances when rivals are selected as targets, the disputes are particularly likely to escalate to the actual use of violence. Though more work is certainly needed, it seems plausible that reputational concerns create an interesting strategic interaction here. Rivals are not particularly attractive diversionary targets. But when an unpopular leader has no other conflict opportunities and must target a rival as a diversion, the conflict is particularly prone to escalation. Indeed, the high probability of escalation may be the reason why rivals are not particularly attractive diversionary targets in the first place. In any event, the question warrants further attention.

Table A7: Fatal Disputes*

	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Aut**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Aut**
TARGET POWER	**0.479**	**0.833**	**0.120**	**0.503**	**0.804**	**0.137**
	0.000	0.000	0.422	0.000	0.000	0.346
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.030**	**0.031**	**-0.003**	**-0.027**	**0.023**	**-0.003**
	0.000	0.335	0.813	0.000	0.480	0.818
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**-0.014**	**-0.054**	**0.002**	**-0.015**	**-0.056**	**0.002**
	0.003	0.000	0.744	0.001	0.000	0.751
DISTANCE	**-0.061**	**-0.095**	**-0.101**	**-0.080**	**-0.157**	**-0.097**
	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**-4.747**	**-18.906**	**-3.069**	**-4.799**	**-19.554**	**-3.070**
	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.002
S SCORE	**-0.432**	**0.391**	**-0.881**	**-0.566**	**0.110**	**-0.862**
	0.018	0.231	0.001	0.003	0.764	0.002
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.777**	**1.222**	**-1.382**	**-0.821**	**1.268**	**-1.380**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
RIVALRY	**1.189**	**1.406**	**1.098**	**1.051**	**1.106**	**1.094**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**0.145**	**-0.054**	**0.247**	**0.168**	**0.028**	**0.248**
	0.063	0.691	0.012	0.032	0.840	0.011
MASS UNREST	**0.008**	**0.007**	**0.018**	**-0.073**	**-0.145**	**0.032**
	0.023	0.117	0.136	0.001	0.000	0.568
UNREST X TARG POWER	**0.031**	**0.016**	**0.015**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.011	0.320	0.575	---	---	---
UNREST X RIVALRY	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.050**	**0.070**	**.002**
	---	---	---	0.000	0.000	0.941
UNREST X DISTANCE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.006**	**0.015**	**-.003**
	---	---	---	0.002	0.000	0.540
UNREST X *S* SCORE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.055**	**0.081**	**-0.005**
	---	---	---	0.002	0.007	0.925
CONSTANT	**-1.668**	**-3.485**	**-0.701**	**-1.458**	**-2.928**	**-0.729**
	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.029
n	74808	39114	35694	74808	39114	35694

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Section A8: Generalized Estimating Equations

In this section, I use an alternative method to account for temporal dependence among observations in directed dyads. As mentioned in the text, correlated data violate the assumptions of independence and normally distributed error terms, potentially creating biased and inefficient estimates. In the body of the paper, I corrected for this using peace-year polynomials, as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010). Here, I use an alternative strategy. I estimate Generalized Estimating Equations models, which allow the analyst to control for temporal dependence, specifying the precise correlation structure (Zorn 2001). GEE models capture population-averaged effects, and are particularly useful for assessing the cross-national validity of the rally and gambling hypotheses. In Table A8, I present results of the GEE models assuming a one-stage autoregressive correlation, dropping the peace-year polynomials from the analyses. The results in Table A8 are largely the same as those presented in the paper. None of the Rally Hypotheses are supported, and all three models strongly support Hypothesis G1.

Table A8: Generalized Estimating Equations*

	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Aut**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Aut**
TARGET POWER	**-0.729**	**-0.467**	**-0.828**	**-0.559**	**-0.240**	**-0.697**
	0.000	0.161	0.004	0.005	0.514	0.017
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.028**	**-0.175**	**-0.016**	**-0.026**	**-0.183**	**-0.013**
	0.004	0.000	0.479	0.007	0.000	0.578
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.009**	**-0.029**	**0.033**	**0.008**	**-0.030**	**0.033**
	0.304	0.047	0.003	0.378	0.042	0.002
DISTANCE	**-0.380**	**-0.303**	**-0.516**	**-0.396**	**-0.322**	**-0.538**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.426**	**-0.112**	**-0.166**	**0.399**	**-0.142**	**-0.108**
	0.551	0.963	0.796	0.568	0.950	0.865
S SCORE	**-1.522**	**-1.190**	**-2.168**	**-1.653**	**-1.525**	**-2.151**
	0.000	0.012	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.050**	**2.077**	**-0.264**	**-0.107**	**1.991**	**-0.258**
	0.877	0.000	0.508	0.743	0.000	0.517
RIVALRY	**2.809**	**3.412**	**2.524**	**2.783**	**3.392**	**2.560**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.335**	**-0.301**	**-0.310**	**-0.325**	**-0.303**	**-0.279**
	0.003	0.075	0.081	0.004	0.073	0.117
MASS UNREST	**0.002**	**0.001**	**-0.039**	**-0.028**	**-0.034**	**0.107**
	0.751	0.931	0.115	0.145	0.193	0.078
UNREST X TARG POWER	**0.085**	**0.064**	**0.129**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.000	0.021	0.013	---	---	---
UNREST X RIVALRY	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.011**	**0.007**	**-0.047**
	---	---	---	0.231	0.479	0.119
UNREST X DISTANCE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**.004**	**.004**	**.003**
	---	---	---	0.058	0.117	0.451
UNREST X *S* SCORE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.044**	**0.048**	**-0.101**
	---	---	---	0.050	0.116	0.153
CONSTANT	**-2.484**	**-2.807**	**-1.443**	**-2.388**	**-2.491**	**-1.509**
	0.000	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.001	0.028
n	71148	34009	27239	71148	34009	27239

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Section A9: Peace Years

Next, I respecified the models assessing Rally Hypothesis 1, on the conditioning effect of target rivalry. In many ways, the dichotomous coding of rivalry is a blunt measure of conflict history. As such, I interacted domestic unrest with a count variable capturing the number of years since the dyad last experience a militarized dispute. This continuous measure of conflict history offers a more fine-grained picture of a potential target's "out-group" standing. A recent conflict between two states, if fresh in the population's memory, could cement that state as an out-group even if the dyad does not have the prolonged history of repeated disputes that typically defines a rivalry. As such, testing whether the effect of unrest is conditioned by the elapsed time since the last dyadic dispute may be an appropriate test of Hypothesis R1.

Table A9 presents the results, which are somewhat mixed. Hypothesis R1 would expect the interactive coefficient for unrest and peace years to be negative and significant. This would indicate that the conflict-inducing effect of domestic unrest is reduced for states that have long been at peace. Two of the three models in Table A9 produce a negative coefficient on the relevant interaction term, but neither achieves conventional standards of statistical significance. The democratic model shows a marginally significant effect (p=.13), but the small size of the interactive coefficient also indicates that the substantive conditional effect is minimal. Visual examination of predicted probabilities confirms this interpretation. The interactive coefficient in the authoritarian models is statistically significant (p=.02), but points in the opposite direction of what Hypothesis R1 would predict. This mirrors the results in Table 1 of the paper. Using peace years, rather than Diehl and Goertz's (2000) measure of rivalry, to operationalize conflict history produces little meaningful change from the results presented in the paper. The Rally Hypotheses again find scant support.

Table A9: Peace Years*

	Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Aut**
TARGET POWER	**-0.484**	**-0.423**	**-0.640**
	0.000	0.011	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.023**	**-0.134**	**-0.017**
	0.000	0.000	0.239
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.012**	**-0.015**	**0.029**
	0.010	0.082	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.344**	**-0.293**	**-0.391**
	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.726**	**-0.248**	**0.952**
	0.087	0.849	0.023
S SCORE	**-1.382**	**-0.910**	**-1.367**
	0.000	0.005	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.113**	**1.057**	**-0.498**
	0.515	0.001	0.019
RIVALRY	**1.850**	**2.278**	**1.544**
	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.208**	**-0.283**	**-0.190**
	0.007	0.016	0.066
MASS UNREST	**-0.025**	**-0.039**	**0.112**
	0.071	0.076	0.099
PEACE YEARS	**-0.133**	**-0.111**	**-0.159**
	0.000	0.000	0.000
UNREST X DISTANCE	**.004**	**0.006**	**-0.006**
	0.010	0.007	0.298
UNREST X *S* SCORE	**0.048**	**0.058**	**-0.120**
	0.004	0.027	0.115
UNREST X PEACE YEARS	**-.0001**	**-.0004**	**.001**
	0.468	0.126	0.018
CONSTANT	**-1.531**	**-1.654**	**-1.040**
	0.000	0.000	0.004
n	74808	39114	35694

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Section A10: Separated Rally Models

Finally, there is a possibility that the results for the Rally Hypotheses were compromised due to collinearity induced by the inclusion of multiple interaction terms with the unrest variable. Correlation between these interaction terms could inflate the standard errors and bias the results against the Rally Hypotheses. These correlated terms might also be "soaking up" some of the variation actually attributable to other interaction variables. To account for this, I reran the models testing the Rally Hypotheses to include one interaction term per model. This required nine separate tests – one for each of the three Rally Hypotheses, for each of the three samples of cases. The results are presented in Table A10.

The findings produce no support for any of the three Rally Hypotheses. The results for Hypotheses R2 and R3, on the conditioning effect of distance and political compatibility, are no longer significant, but continue to point in the direction opposite what the Rally Hypotheses predict. In the authoritarian models, the conditioning effect of target rivalry is significant in the wrong direction. All three Rally Hypotheses again fail to find support. The Gambling Hypotheses are not examined in these tests.

Table A10: Separated Rally Models*

	Full Sample			Democracies			Autocracies		
TARGET POWER	**-0.499**	**-0.497**	**-0.485**	**-0.446**	**-0.457**	**-0.422**	**-0.642**	**-0.632**	**-0.635**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.006	0.011	0.000	0.000	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.023**	**-0.023**	**-0.023**	**-0.135**	**-0.134**	**-0.134**	**-0.016**	**-0.015**	**-0.017**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.243	0.281	0.236
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.013**	**0.013**	**0.013**	**-0.014**	**-0.015**	**-0.014**	**0.028**	**0.028**	**0.029**
	0.006	0.006	0.009	0.086	0.075	0.091	0.000	0.000	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.326**	**-0.329**	**-0.325**	**-0.259**	**-0.273**	**-0.257**	**-0.404**	**-0.408**	**-0.402**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.720**	**0.729**	**0.728**	**-0.205**	**-0.229**	**-0.193**	**0.976**	**0.950**	**0.938**
	0.091	0.087	0.087	0.876	0.863	0.882	0.019	0.023	0.025
S SCORE	**-1.203**	**-1.202**	**-1.280**	**-0.623**	**-0.593**	**-0.692**	**-1.551**	**-1.521**	**-1.396**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.042	0.055	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.132**	**-0.130**	**-0.119**	**1.027**	**1.075**	**1.023**	**-0.485**	**-0.494**	**-0.493**
	0.446	0.451	0.492	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.022	0.020	0.020
RIVALRY	**1.832**	**1.853**	**1.852**	**2.253**	**2.296**	**2.287**	**1.635**	**1.547**	**1.543**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.219**	**-0.220**	**-0.218**	**-0.286**	**-0.278**	**-0.295**	**-0.186**	**-0.180**	**-0.185**
	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.015	0.018	0.012	0.074	0.086	0.076
MASS UNREST	**0.012**	**0.012**	**0.005**	**0.008**	**0.003**	**0.006**	**0.042**	**0.010**	**0.106**
	0.013	0.088	0.613	0.202	0.723	0.550	0.000	0.487	0.111
UNREST X RIVALRY	**0.006**	**---**	**---**	**0.006**	**---**	**---**	**-0.070**	**---**	**---**
	0.368	---	---	0.463	---	---	.004	---	---
UNREST X DISTANCE	**---**	**.001**	**---**	**---**	**.002**	**---**	**---**	**.003**	**---**
	---	0.608	---	---	0.250	---	---	0.493	---
UNREST X *S* SCORE	**---**	**---**	**0.020**	**---**	**---**	**0.012**	**---**	**---**	**-0.107**
	---	---	0.190	---	---	0.488	---	---	0.161
CONSTANT	**-1.657**	**-1.662**	**-1.627**	**-1.858**	**-1.892**	**-1.844**	**-0.937**	**-0.916**	**-1.029**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.007	0.009	0.005
n	74808	74808	74808	39114	39114	39114	35694	35694	35694

* Coefficients in **bold**, robust p-values in plain text below the coefficients.

Section A11: Dropping *S* score/Rivalry as Controls

Because a target's *S* Score and rivalry status are somewhat closely related constructs, including these variables as controls might also be inflating the standard errors on the interaction term and biasing our results against the Rally Hypotheses. These controls might also simply be reflecting some of the variation in dispute initiation deriving from the independent variable(s) of interest. As such, I re-ran the models assessing Rally Hypotheses one and three while dropping the controls for geopolitical compatibility and rivalry, respectively. Either of these could increase the likelihood of finding a statistically significant interactive effect. Table A11 presents the findings.

The results remain largely unchanged. Target rivalry is again shown not to increase the probability of diversionary conflict, and the authoritarian sample still shows a significant effect in the opposite direction of what Hypothesis R1 would expect. The authoritarian sample does, however, offer some support for Hypothesis R3, as the results show that the conflict inducing effect of unrest is reduced for targets with higher *S* scores. This effect is significant with greater than 90% confidence ($p = .086$). The full sample and democratic models remain unsupportive of Hypothesis R3, and the interactive coefficients in fact approach significance in the opposite direction of R3's predictions. In all, the results in Table A11 offer at best only meager support for the claim that diversionary conflict disproportionately targets politically incompatible states.

Table A11: Dropping S-Score/Rivalry

	Drop *S* Score			Drop Rivalry		
	Full	**Dem**	**Aut**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Aut**
TARGET POWER	**-0.417**	**-0.481**	**-0.398**	**-0.643**	**-0.373**	**-0.825**
	0.000	0.003	0.005	0.000	0.017	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.016**	**-0.120**	**-0.021**	**-0.028**	**-0.122**	**-0.014**
	0.001	0.000	0.139	0.000	0.000	0.329
TARG DEMOCRACY	**0.012**	**-0.019**	**0.036**	**0.013**	**-0.016**	**0.037**
	0.013	0.020	0.000	0.006	0.033	0.000
DISTANCE	**-0.246**	**-0.219**	**-0.329**	**-0.385**	**-0.329**	**-0.451**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**0.781**	**-0.064**	**0.923**	**0.166**	**-0.587**	**0.432**
	0.076	0.961	0.032	0.700	0.606	0.328
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.124**	**0.988**	**-0.452**	**-0.173**	**0.798**	**-0.576**
	0.474	0.002	0.033	0.301	0.006	0.006
RIVALRY	**1.836**	**2.280**	**1.595**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	---	---	---
***S* SCORE**	**---**	**---**	**---**	**-1.285**	**-1.168**	**-1.082**
	---	**---**	**---**	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.185**	**-0.249**	**-0.186**	**0.061**	**0.071**	**0.042**
	0.016	0.035	0.078	0.415	0.538	0.682
MASS UNREST	**0.014**	**0.009**	**0.039**	**0.005**	**0.001**	**0.125**
	0.004	0.177	0.001	0.611	0.913	0.050
UNREST X RIVALRY	**0.006**	**0.005**	**-0.065**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.384	0.517	0.007	---	---	---
UNREST X *S* SCORE	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.022**	**0.024**	**-0.125**
	---	**---**	**---**	0.136	0.167	0.086
CONSTANT	**-2.754**	**-2.498**	**-2.445**	**-0.748**	**-0.577**	**-0.484**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.116	0.148
n	74808	39114	35694	74808	39114	35694

Section A12: Split-Sample Models

Next, I need to establish more clearly that the gambling for resurrection dynamics are operating independently of any rally effects. In effect, I need to show that the support for the gambling theory demonstrated above operates for both rival and non-rival, distant and proximate, and compatible and incompatible targets. This will help demonstrate that the results supporting gambling for resurrection theory do not in fact indicate hidden rally dynamics. If the conflict inducing effect of unrest were only positively conditioned by target power when the target is also a rival, neighbor, or incompatible, it would be impossible to disentangle the explanations.

To examine the mutual exclusivity of these theories, I split each sample of observations into subsets of rivals and non-rivals, contiguous and non-contiguous dyads, and finally into high compatibility and low compatibility groups based on their position relative to the median dyadic *S* Score. I then ran the gambling models on each subsample to see if the conditioning effect of target power differed appreciably. The results are presented in Tables A12a, A12b, and A12c.

The findings remain impressively supportive of the gambling hypothesis, and offer little indication that the evidence in support of the gambling for resurrection model is obscuring any sort of rally dynamic. All six of the split-full sample models in Table A12a support the Gambling Hypothesis with at least 95% confidence. All six of the split-democratic sample models in Table A12b offer support with at least 90% confidence. Two of the authoritarian split-sample models fail to reach 90% confidence, but importantly, these are the rival and incompatible subsamples. If the results presented in the manuscript were in fact tainted by a hidden rally dynamic, we would expect these models to reveal *more* significant findings. In short, the results presented in Tables A12a-c remain highly supportive of the Gambling Hypothesis, and continue to reject all three Rally Hypotheses.

Table A12a – Split Sample Models (Full Sample)

	Full Sample					
	Rivals	Non-Rivals	Contiguous	Non-Contig	Compatible	Incompatible
Target Power	**-0.515**	**-0.670**	**-0.703**	**-0.221**	**-0.712**	**-0.822**
	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.285	0.000	0.000
Sender Democracy	**-0.014**	**-0.036**	**-0.018**	**-0.028**	**-0.009**	**-0.060**
	0.089	0.000	0.005	0.002	0.173	0.000
Target Democracy	**0.022**	**0.022**	**0.015**	**0.026**	**0.007**	**0.013**
	0.008	0.001	0.018	0.009	0.293	0.148
Distance	**-0.127**	**-0.382**	**---**	**-0.180**	**-0.621**	**-0.208**
	0.001	0.000	---	0.000	0.000	0.000
Trade	**-1.015**	**0.547**	**-0.694**	**2.353**	**-0.106**	**1.812**
	0.440	0.247	0.388	0.000	0.886	0.001
***S* Score**	**-0.717**	**-1.241**	**-0.487**	**-2.063**	**-1.020**	**-2.171**
	0.032	0.000	0.136	0.000	0.090	0.000
Fractionalization	**0.391**	**-0.495**	**-0.485**	**-0.273**	**-0.318**	**-0.459**
	0.166	0.024	0.014	0.482	0.129	0.142
Rivalry	**---**	**---**	**1.482**	**2.895**	**1.750**	**2.266**
	---	---	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Other Dispute	**-0.053**	**-0.546**	**-0.292**	**0.162**	**-0.221**	**-0.111**
	0.636	0.000	0.002	0.297	0.019	0.413
Mass Unrest	**0.000**	**0.008**	**0.018**	**0.000**	**0.017**	**-0.002**
	0.958	0.328	0.089	0.960	0.123	0.803
Unrest X Targ Pwr	**0.054**	**0.086**	**0.082**	**0.059**	**0.074**	**0.073**
	0.047	0.000	0.001	0.012	0.001	0.004
Constant	**-0.804**	**-1.105**	**-1.717**	**-2.732**	**-1.534**	**-1.447**
	0.018	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.000
n	2794	72014	19179	55629	36768	38040

Table A12b: Split Sample Models (Democracies)

	Democracies					
	Rivals	Non-Rival	Contig	Non-Contig	Compat	Incompat
TARGET POWER	**-0.670**	**-0.559**	**-1.047**	**-0.570**	**-1.222**	**-0.162**
	0.046	0.011	0.000	0.037	0.000	0.575
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.272**	**-0.116**	**-0.090**	**-0.236**	**-0.089**	**-0.212**
	0.000	0.002	0.016	0.000	0.018	0.000
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**-0.010**	**-0.009**	**-0.016**	**-0.010**	**-0.028**	**-0.020**
	0.559	0.390	0.145	0.497	0.013	0.174
DISTANCE	**0.020**	**-0.403**	**---**	**-0.149**	**-0.468**	**-0.212**
	0.732	0.000	---	0.003	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**-4.132**	**-0.063**	**-0.665**	**1.726**	**0.271**	**0.367**
	0.142	0.965	0.788	0.148	0.894	0.836
S SCORE	**-0.042**	**-0.588**	**0.551**	**-1.204**	**-0.518**	**-1.975**
	0.928	0.226	0.363	0.005	0.652	0.000
FRACTIONALIZATION	**2.099**	**0.109**	**-0.831**	**1.303**	**-0.415**	**1.358**
	0.001	0.796	0.058	0.050	0.366	0.026
RIVALRY	**---**	**---**	**1.321**	**3.648**	**1.883**	**2.887**
	---	---	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**-0.361**	**-0.464**	**-0.607**	**0.102**	**-0.605**	**0.021**
	0.065	0.007	0.001	0.612	0.001	0.916
MASS UNREST	**-0.002**	**0.010**	**0.023**	**0.001**	**0.024**	**0.000**
	0.764	0.260	0.091	0.882	0.138	0.956
UNREST X TARG PWR	**0.067**	**0.067**	**0.090**	**0.039**	**0.061**	**0.048**
	0.028	0.002	0.009	0.087	0.054	0.065
CONSTANT	**0.289**	**-1.270**	**-1.550**	**-2.686**	**-0.935**	**-1.900**
	0.646	0.024	0.017	0.000	0.439	0.002
n	1211	37903	6463	32651	16249	22865

Table A12c: Split-Sample Models (Authoritarians)

			Authoritarian			
	Rivals	Non-Rivals	Contig	Non-Contig	Compat	Incompat
TARGET POWER	**-0.501**	**-0.941**	**-0.672**	**-0.186**	**-0.566**	**-1.589**
	0.084	0.000	0.000	0.701	0.002	0.000
SENDER DEMOCRACY	**-0.046**	**-0.016**	**-0.034**	**-0.005**	**-0.024**	**-0.045**
	0.050	0.384	0.031	0.869	0.128	0.174
TARGET DEMOCRACY	**0.029**	**0.035**	**0.027**	**0.054**	**0.028**	**0.040**
	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.011
DISTANCE	**-0.432**	**-0.362**	**---**	**-0.222**	**-0.737**	**-0.229**
	0.003	0.000	---	0.000	0.000	0.000
TRADE	**1.528**	**0.775**	**-0.051**	**2.215**	**0.150**	**1.988**
	0.297	0.104	0.933	0.000	0.796	0.000
S SCORE	**-1.433**	**-1.451**	**-0.880**	**-1.964**	**-1.103**	**-1.885**
	0.041	0.000	0.043	0.000	0.137	0.001
FRACTIONALIZATION	**-0.141**	**-0.813**	**-0.479**	**-1.088**	**-0.401**	**-0.862**
	0.692	0.002	0.041	0.021	0.100	0.058
RIVALRY	**---**	**---**	**1.540**	**2.232**	**1.643**	**1.547**
	---	---	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OTHER DISPUTE	**0.023**	**-0.619**	**-0.191**	**0.057**	**-0.097**	**-0.459**
	0.875	0.000	0.094	0.819	0.402	0.046
MASS UNREST	**-0.040**	**-0.018**	**-0.017**	**-0.036**	**-0.029**	**-0.017**
	0.150	0.490	0.477	0.438	0.171	0.751
UNREST X TARG PWR	**0.041**	**0.125**	**0.102**	**0.164**	**0.132**	**0.115**
	0.690	0.001	0.015	0.004	0.000	0.145
CONSTANT	**-0.142**	**-0.406**	**-1.522**	**-1.712**	**-1.452**	**-0.238**
	0.844	0.297	0.001	0.020	0.053	0.669
n	1583	34111	12716	22978	20519	15175

Section A13: Excluding Distant Minor Power → Major Power Observations

Finally, I examine whether the use of "politically relevant dyads" influences the results in any meaningful way. To recap, politically relevant dyads include pairs of states that are either geographically contiguous or that contain at least one great power with global power projection capabilities. Because of their expansive interests and capabilities, great powers are considered politically relevant to every other state in the system. The ability of major powers to threaten minor powers is relatively uncontroversial. But in dyads that include a major power and a minor power, the directed-dyadic set up assumes that the *minor* power can initiate a dispute against the major power as well. This may be problematic for weak minor powers in a dyad with distant major powers. I included these observations in the main tests because the minor power may be able to threaten the major power's overseas bases or interests. But it is certainly worth examining whether the inclusion of these potentially problematic cases influences the results.

To test this, I dropped all observations in which the target state in the directed dyad controlled at least 95% of the aggregate dyadic power *and* is located at least 1,000 miles from the initiating state. This effectively excludes highly asymmetric directed dyads where the initiating state is both very weak and very distant from the potential target. The results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript. The Gambling Hypothesis is supported in all three models, while the Rally Hypotheses find no support. Table A13 presents these results.

Table A13: Excluding Distant Minor Power → Major Power Observations

	Drop Minor Power --> Major Power Dyads					
	Gambling Models			Rally Models		
	Full	**Dem**	**Aut**	**Full**	**Dem**	**Aut**
Target Power	**-0.428**	**-0.417**	**-0.562**	**-0.248**	**-0.161**	**-0.418**
	0.000	0.031	0.001	0.039	0.386	0.013
Sender Democracy	**-0.024**	**-0.139**	**-0.028**	**-0.022**	**-0.142**	**-0.025**
	0.000	0.000	0.070	0.000	0.000	0.095
Target Democracy	**0.015**	**-0.009**	**0.028**	**0.014**	**-0.010**	**0.029**
	0.003	0.305	0.000	0.006	0.242	0.000
Distance	**-0.290**	**-0.225**	**-0.357**	**-0.305**	**-0.254**	**-0.359**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Trade	**-0.115**	**-0.751**	**0.091**	**-0.172**	**-0.901**	**0.094**
	0.854	0.681	0.870	0.780	0.617	0.865
S-Score	**-1.101**	**-0.574**	**-1.336**	**-1.260**	**-0.905**	**-1.245**
	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.001
Fractionalization	**0.115**	**1.241**	**-0.280**	**0.054**	**1.180**	**-0.288**
	0.525	0.000	0.215	0.766	0.000	0.203
Rivalry	**1.839**	**2.249**	**1.556**	**1.813**	**2.198**	**1.607**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Other Dispute	**-0.208**	**-0.311**	**-0.180**	**-0.193**	**-0.306**	**-0.158**
	0.008	0.008	0.093	0.014	0.010	0.142
Mass Unrest	**0.002**	**0.001**	**-0.032**	**-0.027**	**-0.044**	**0.140**
	0.703	0.854	0.124	0.047	0.032	0.029
Unrest X Targ Power	**0.084**	**0.073**	**0.133**	**---**	**---**	**---**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	---	---	---
Unrest X Rivalry	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.009**	**0.010**	**-0.066**
	---	---	---	0.214	0.209	0.009
Unrest X Distance	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.004**	**0.006**	**-0.005**
	---	---	---	0.051	0.021	0.226
Unrest X S-Score	**---**	**---**	**---**	**0.044**	**0.055**	**-0.108**
	---	---	---	0.007	0.022	0.134
Constant	**-1.913**	**-1.964**	**-1.291**	**-1.794**	**-1.672**	**-1.441**
	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001
n	54,800	32,232	22,568	54,800	32,232	22,568

Section A14: Summary

This section reviews the findings presented in the supplementary materials. The robustness checks presented here largely reinforce the findings in the paper, showing strong support for the Gambling Hypothesis. The evidence strongly suggests that embattled leaders tend to initiate diversionary conflicts. Multiple respecifications of domestic instability support these conclusions, as do tests utilizing alternative statistical models, case populations, and control variables. Split-sample models also show that the gambling for resurrection dynamics generally operate consistently for rival and non-rival, compatible and incompatible, and contiguous and distant dyads. The Rally Hypotheses continue to find virtually no support. Importantly, an economic operationalization of leadership instability appears to have no effect on conflict propensities, either conditionally or unconditionally. This undermines diversionary war theory more generally, and thus necessarily refutes both the Rally and Gambling Hypotheses.

As discussed in Section A7, respecifying the models using fatal disputes as the dependent variable weakens our confidence in Hypothesis G1, which only finds support in the full sample model. But these tests also indicate that fatal diversionary conflicts are more likely to target rivals. This is likely due less to the targeting preferences of embattled leaders than the greater willingness of rival targets to escalate the dispute. This strategic interaction requires further investigation.

In all, I ran 42 models assessing the robustness of the Gambling Hypothesis, with 35 of these supporting the hypothesis with at least 90% confidence. I ran 36 models as robustness checks assessing each of the various Rally Hypotheses, with only three of those tests producing supportive results with at least 90% confidence. In short, the robustness tests described in this supplementary appendix largely reinforce our confidence in the gambling for resurrection theory, and again underminethe rally around the flag hypotheses.